Peers have issued a stark warning over the scope of ministerial powers in the Government’s flagship Railways Bill, raising fresh questions about parliamentary oversight as legislation to establish Great British Railways (GBR) moves through the House of Lords.
In its Fourth Report of the 2026–27 session, published on 10 July, the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee (DPRRC) highlighted a series of concerns about how the Department for Transport (DfT) intends to implement key elements of the Bill — particularly provisions tied to the future rail “access regime”.
A pivotal step towards public ownership
The Railways Bill represents a critical milestone in the Government’s wider rail reform programme. Following the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Act 2024, which removed the presumption of private operation, this second legislative phase focuses on creating GBR as the central “directing mind” of the network.
Under the proposals, GBR will oversee infrastructure and most passenger services, set fares, manage ticketing, and coordinate planning across the network. The Bill also introduces a new Passenger Watchdog and formalises a greater role for metro mayors in shaping local rail services.
However, it is the mechanisms for transitioning to this new structure — rather than the overall vision — that have drawn the sharpest scrutiny.
Clause 71 under fire: “Unilateral right” to amend contracts
The DPRRC’s most direct criticism centres on clause 71, which would give ministers the power to amend existing track access agreements as responsibilities shift from Network Rail to GBR over the next 15 years.
While the committee acknowledged that “some transitional power is reasonable” and that the DfT had “made a good case” for needing one, it warned that the clause is drafted far too broadly.
As it stands, clause 71 provides what peers described as a “unilateral right to amend contracts to which the Government is a party,” with no explicit legal constraint tying its use to transitional purposes.
The DfT has sought to reassure lawmakers that the power “will not be exercised lightly” and that “the core rights in these contracts will be preserved as far as possible.” But the committee dismissed this line of argument, reiterating a principle it has long upheld:
“we do not judge delegated powers on how the Government says it will use them but on how any Government might use them.”
It added:
“A power drafted more broadly than necessary is not above criticism merely because the Government say they will not use the power to its full extent.”
As a result, peers have recommended tightening clause 71 so it can only be used for its stated purpose — and importantly, upgrading its scrutiny level from the negative procedure to the affirmative procedure, requiring explicit parliamentary approval.
Concerns over Henry VIII powers
Further issues arise from clauses 72 and 73, which contain so-called Henry VIII powers allowing ministers to amend primary legislation through secondary legislation.
Although these powers are already subject to the affirmative procedure, the committee questioned whether they are justified at all.
Clause 73 — which enables ministers to redefine what constitutes “GBR infrastructure” — came in for particular criticism. The committee found the Government’s reasoning weak, noting that the definition is central to the Bill and used extensively, yet could be altered with limited constraint.
The DfT’s justification, including the need to keep pace with technological change, was dismissed as unconvincing, with peers stating it was “difficult to see” how such developments would require altering a definition of this nature. They have recommended removing clause 73(2) entirely.
Meanwhile, clause 72 raised additional concern due to the breadth of its consequential amendment power. The provision allows changes to “this or any other Act”, which, unusually, could include future legislation not yet passed.
The committee highlighted that such a power is “rare and normally specifically justified”, yet no such justification was provided. It has called for the Bill to be amended to prevent this reach extending into future Acts.
Dehybridisation clause raises transparency questions
The DPRRC also flagged clause 98(6), which disapplies the House of Lords’ hybrid instrument procedure for certain regulations under the Bill.
In practice, this removes a mechanism through which affected parties can formally petition Parliament if their private interests are directly impacted.
While the committee stopped short of recommending a change, it urged the Lords to ensure that adequate alternative protections exist, given that a longstanding parliamentary safeguard would effectively be bypassed.
What this means for GBR and the sector
Although DPRRC recommendations are not binding, they carry significant influence in the Lords and often shape amendments during Committee and Report stages.
With cross-party backing for rail reform broadly intact, the debate is now shifting towards how powers are framed and controlled — particularly where they intersect with private sector rights and constitutional norms.
For industry stakeholders — including operators, suppliers, and regional authorities — the outcome of these discussions could have material implications. Changes to clause 71 alone could affect how legacy contracts are handled, while wider scrutiny of delegated powers may influence the flexibility GBR has in shaping the future network.
As the Bill progresses, ministers are likely to face sustained pressure to justify the breadth of their proposed powers — and to demonstrate that the balance between efficiency and accountability has been properly struck.
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